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In 2017, the League of Women Voters and a group of 
Pennsylvania Democratic voters filed a state court lawsuit 
challenging Pennsylvania’s 2011 congressional districting 
map. The suit alleged the state’s Republican lawmakers drew 
the congressional map to entrench Republican power in 
Pennsylvania’s congressional delegation and disadvantage 
Democratic voters. Plaintiffs contended the Republican 
redistricting plan violated the Pennsylvania Constitution by 
burdening and disfavoring Democratic voters’ rights to free 
expression and association and by intentionally discriminating 
against Democratic voters, disadvantaging their 
representational rights. 
 
This appeal, although arising from that litigation, does 
not involve the substance of the underlying state constitutional 
challenge. Rather, it involves a fee dispute stemming from a 
brief period during which the suit was before a federal district 
court. Some five months after the suit was filed in state court, 
defendant State Senate President Pro Tempore Joseph 
Scarnati—a Republican lawmaker who sponsored the 2011 
redistricting plan—removed the matter to federal court, 
contending federal jurisdiction existed because of a newly 
scheduled congressional election. Following a burst of filings 
and an emergency hearing, the federal District Court remanded 
the matter to state court, where the suit continued and has since 
concluded.1 Relying on 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), the federal court 
later directed Senator Scarnati personally to pay $29,360 to 
plaintiffs for costs and fees incurred in the removal and remand 
                                              
1  The Pennsylvania Supreme Court ultimately ruled in 
plaintiffs’ favor, declaring that the 2011 redistricting plan 
violated the Pennsylvania Constitution. League of Women 
Voters of Pa. v. Commonwealth, 178 A.3d 737, 741 (Pa. 2018). 
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proceedings. 
 
Senator Scarnati disputes whether he—a party to the 
case only in his official capacity as President Pro Tempore of 
the State Senate—should have been held personally liable for 
the costs and fees award. Recognizing the Supreme Court’s 
directive that courts carefully adhere to the distinction between 
personal and official capacity suits, we will resolve this issue 
in favor of Senator Scarnati. As to his other challenges to the 
award, we conclude the District Court did not abuse its 
discretion in holding the removal lacked an objectively 
reasonable basis, nor in calculating the proper costs and fees to 
be awarded. Accordingly, we will affirm those parts of the 
Court’s order, reverse its order holding Senator Scarnati 
personally liable, and remand for further proceedings.  
 
I. 
A. 
As noted, on June 15, 2017, plaintiff-appellees—
eighteen Pennsylvania Democratic voters—filed a petition in 
the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court contending 
Pennsylvania’s 2011 congressional districting plan was a 
product of partisan gerrymandering that violated the 
Pennsylvania Constitution.2 According to the petition, in 2011 
Republican state lawmakers “dismantled Pennsylvania’s 
existing congressional districts and stitched them back together 
                                              
2  The League of Women Voters of Pennsylvania was also 
a party in the state court action. The Commonwealth Court 
dismissed the organization from the suit before it was removed 
to federal court. See Joint Appendix (App.) 342.  
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with the goal of maximizing the political advantage of 
Republican voters and minimizing the representational rights 
of Democratic voters.” Joint Appendix (App.) 45. The suit 
named as defendants various state officials, all “in their official 
capacities as parties who would be responsible for 
implementing the relief” sought. App. 56. These included 
Governor Thomas Wolf; Secretary of the Commonwealth 
Pedro Cortés; Bureau of Commissions, Election, and 
Legislation Commissioner Jonathan Marks; Lieutenant 
Governor Michael Stack; Speaker of the Pennsylvania House 
of Representatives Michael Turzai; and Senate President Pro 
Tempore Scarnati. The Commonwealth and the General 
Assembly were also named as defendants.  
 
Four months later, the Commonwealth Court stayed the 
case on the motion of defendants Senator Scarnati, 
Representative Turzai, and the General Assembly. Due to the 
delay in the Commonwealth Court, plaintiffs asked the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court to assume extraordinary 
jurisdiction to resolve the case before the 2018 congressional 
elections. On November 9, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
granted plaintiffs’ request because the “case involves issues of 
immediate public importance.” App. 320. It vacated the stay 
and ordered “expeditious[]” proceedings below, setting a year-
end deadline for the Commonwealth Court to conduct a trial. 
Id. On November 13, the Commonwealth Court issued an 
expedited scheduling order, with trial set for December 11, 
2017.  
 
B. 
The day after the Commonwealth Court issued its 
scheduling order, Senator Scarnati removed the case to the 
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United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). Although the 
underlying petition included only state law claims, he 
contended there was federal question jurisdiction because, on 
October 23, 2017, Governor Wolf issued a Writ of Election to 
set a special election for a newly vacant seat in Congress. See 
U.S. Const. art. I, § 2, cl. 4 (“When vacancies happen in the 
Representation from any State, the Executive Authority thereof 
shall issue Writs of Election to fill such Vacancies.”). Senator 
Scarnati maintained that because the Writ was issued under the 
United States Constitution, it introduced a “substantial 
question of federal law” into the case—whether a state court 
could “strike down” a congressional district for which a special 
election was already scheduled. App. 24. In the notice of 
removal, Senator Scarnati averred that Representative Turzai 
and the General Assembly had consented to removal, and 
contended he did not need the consent of the other defendants 
because of their “nominal” status. App. 25–26. 
 
Plaintiffs learned of the removal the next day, 
November 15, and within twenty-four hours filed an 
emergency motion to remand to state court. The United States 
District Court scheduled a hearing for that afternoon on 
plaintiffs’ motion to remand. Right before the hearing, Senator 
Scarnati filed his own emergency motion seeking remand to 
state court. The motion explained that there was a 
misunderstanding with Representative Turzai, who did not 
actually consent to removal. The District Court held its 
hearing—attended by plaintiffs’ counsel who traveled from 
Washington, D.C.—and then granted Senator Scarnati’s 
motion, remanding the case to state court.  
 
C. 
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In accordance with the District Court’s remand order, 
plaintiffs asked for, under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), “payment of 
just costs and . . . attorney fees[] incurred as a result of the 
removal.” They sought: (1) $49,616.50 in attorneys’ fees, 
which covered 82 hours of work by 10 attorneys from the 
Washington, D.C. office of Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer and 
the Public Interest Law Center of Philadelphia (PILCOP); and 
(2) $3,120.02 in costs for travel and legal research expenses. 
Those fees and costs had been incurred preparing the remand 
motion, preparing for and attending the emergency hearing, 
and preparing the costs motion itself. Plaintiffs also suggested 
sanctions were warranted under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 11 or the Court’s inherent authority. Finally, they 
contended “Senator Scarnati and his counsel . . . should be held 
jointly and severally liable” for any award to “avoid placing 
the burden for such fees and costs on Pennsylvania taxpayers.” 
App. 400.  
 
The District Court granted plaintiffs’ motion and 
awarded costs and fees under § 1447(c). League of Women 
Voters of Pa. v. Pennsylvania, No. 17-5137, 2018 WL 
1787211, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 13, 2018). It held removal was 
improper because Senator Scarnati had no basis for believing 
that removal was timely or that he did not need the consent of 
the executive branch defendants. Id. at *4–5. The Court did not 
“stat[e] any opinion on whether there was ‘colorable’ federal 
jurisdiction,” and did “not come to any conclusion that 
improper motive or bad faith [was] involved.” Id. at *6.  
 
Turning to the amount of the award, the Court found 
that all written work by plaintiffs’ counsel was “excellent,” id., 
and that the removal action “amounted to an ‘emergency 
situation,’” id. at *7, necessitating “[a] good deal of urgent 
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research and preparation,” id. at *6. It recognized that with 
“numerous attorneys in two different locations” there was 
“some perhaps unavoidable duplication of effort” by plaintiffs’ 
lawyers, and so reduced the hours by twenty percent. Id. at *7. 
The Court determined it would only award fees at a prevailing 
local rate in Philadelphia rather than the higher rates billed by 
the Washington, D.C. lawyers, id. at *6, and applied a “blended 
hourly rate” of $400 per hour, which it found was “a fair 
median hourly rate for the PILCOP lawyers,” id. at *7. The 
resulting fee award was $26,240, and the Court also awarded 
the full $3,120.02 in costs. Id. Finally, and without explanation, 
the Court found “Senator Scarnati should personally be liable 
for these fees and costs.” Id. at *8. He appeals.3 
 
II. 
 The primary issue on appeal is whether the District 
Court erred in imposing personal liability on Senate President 
                                              
3  The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 
1441 to consider whether the matter was removable. After 
remanding, the Court retained jurisdiction to award costs and 
fees under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). See Mints v. Educ. Testing 
Serv., 99 F.3d 1253, 1257–58 (3d Cir. 1996). We have 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 to review the award. 
“We review an award of attorneys’ fees under section 
1447(c) for abuse of discretion.” Roxbury Condo. Ass’n v. 
Anthony S. Cupo Agency, 316 F.3d 224, 226 (3d Cir. 2003). “A 
district court abuses its discretion by basing its decision on ‘a 
clearly erroneous finding of fact, an erroneous legal 
conclusion, or an improper application of law to fact.’” Id. 
(quoting LaSalle Nat’l Bank v. First Conn. Holding Grp., 287 
F.3d 279, 288 (3d Cir. 2002)). 
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Pro Tempore Scarnati for the costs and fees award. He 
challenges other aspects of the Court’s decision, contending 
plaintiffs were not entitled to an award at all under § 1447(c), 
and that the Court erred in calculating the amount owed. We 
first address the predicate question of plaintiffs’ entitlement to 
a § 1447(c) award. We next turn to the most contested issue on 
appeal: the Court’s decision to impose the award on Senator 
Scarnati in his personal, rather than official, capacity. Finally, 
we assess whether the costs and fees awarded were 
appropriate. 
 
A. 
To determine whether plaintiffs are entitled to costs and 
fees as a result of the removal, we begin with a review of the 
removal provisions relevant to this case. A defendant may 
generally remove a civil action from state court if it is one over 
“which the district courts of the United States have original 
jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). In addition to establishing 
federal subject matter jurisdiction, a removing defendant must 
comply with several statutory procedural requirements. See id. 
§§ 1446, 1447. Two of those provisions are at issue here. First, 
removal must occur within thirty days of the defendant’s 
“receipt . . . of the initial pleading,” id. § 1446(b)(1), or within 
thirty days of the defendant’s “receipt . . . of a copy of an 
amended pleading, motion, order or other paper from which it 
may first be ascertained that the case is one which is or has 
become removable,” id. § 1446(b)(3). Second, all defendants 
must join in or consent to removal. Id. § 1446(b)(2). If the 
removing defendant fails to comply with these procedural 
requirements, “[a] motion to remand the case . . . must be made 
within 30 days after the filing of the notice of removal.” Id. § 
1447(c).  
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When a case is remanded to state court, the removing 
defendant may be liable for expenses associated with the 
unsuccessful removal: “An order remanding the case may 
require payment of just costs and any actual expenses, 
including attorney fees, incurred as a result of the removal.” Id. 
In Martin v. Franklin Capital Corp., the Supreme Court 
announced the proper standard for awarding fees under § 
1447(c): “Absent unusual circumstances, courts may award 
attorney’s fees under § 1447(c) only where the removing party 
lacked an objectively reasonable basis for seeking removal.” 
546 U.S. 132, 141 (2005). The Court adopted that standard 
instead of a narrower one under which fees could be awarded 
only if the removing party’s position was “frivolous, 
unreasonable, or without foundation.” Id. at 138. In holding 
that the test should “turn on . . . reasonableness,” the Court 
“recognize[d] the desire to deter removals sought for the 
purpose of prolonging litigation and imposing costs on the 
opposing party, while not undermining Congress’ basic 
decision to afford defendants a right to remove as a general 
matter, when the statutory criteria are satisfied.” Id. at 140–41. 
 
Here, the District Court determined Senator Scarnati 
had no objectively reasonable basis for contending the removal 
statutory criteria were satisfied, as removal was both untimely 
and lacked the consent of the executive branch defendants. It 
awarded costs and fees on that basis.  
 
Senator Scarnati did not remove the case within thirty 
days after receipt of the initial pleading, see 28 U.S.C. § 
1446(b)(1), yet contends his action was timely for another 
reason. According to the Senator, the October 23, 2017 Writ of 
Election was an “other paper,” id. § 1446(b)(3), that “caused 
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the state court matter to suddenly . . . pose a substantial federal 
question,” resetting the thirty-day clock during which he could 
remove, Appellant’s Br. 30. As the District Court described, 
however, our precedent establishes that the terms “an amended 
pleading, motion, order or other paper” in § 1446(b)(3) “only 
address developments within a case,” not a document, such as 
the writ here, which is separate and apart from the case. A.S. ex 
rel. Miller v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 769 F.3d 204, 210 
(3d Cir. 2014) (hereinafter Miller) (citation and alteration 
omitted); accord 14C Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, 
Federal Practice & Procedure § 3731 (4th ed. rev. 2018) 
(documents not generated within the state litigation generally 
are not recognized as “other papers” that can start a 30-day 
removal period under § 1446(b)).  
 
Senator Scarnati does not dispute this general rule and 
concedes that the Writ of Election was not a development 
within the case, but he contends an exception to the rule is 
warranted. He relies primarily on Doe v. American Red Cross, 
where we held that a Supreme Court decision that 
unequivocally authorized the Red Cross to “remov[e] from 
state to federal court . . . any state-law action it is defending” 
qualified as an “order” under § 1446(b)(3), despite not being 
“paper in the case.” 14 F.3d 196, 201–02 (3d Cir. 1993) 
(citation omitted). Senator Scarnati maintains that our 
recognition of an exception in Doe “has opened the door for 
potential additional exceptions,” including in the “equally 
unique circumstances here.” Appellant’s Br. 31. 
 
But in Doe we emphasized that we were “construing 
only the term ‘order’ as set forth in Section 1446(b)” and not 
“the term ‘other paper.’” 14 F.3d at 202. We stressed that our 
decision was “extremely confined” and “narrow.” Id. 
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Subsequently, in Miller, we rejected an attempt to expand Doe 
where a later issued circuit court decision involved the same 
defendant but “did not include the explicit authorization to 
remove other pending cases.” 769 F.3d at 210. We underscored 
that the Doe ruling was “narrow and meant to apply in ‘unique 
circumstances.’” Id. at 211 (quoting Doe, 14 F.3d at 202–03). 
The order in Doe “was not ‘simply . . . an order emanating from 
an unrelated action’” but “was ‘an unequivocal order directed 
to a party to the pending litigation, explicitly authorizing’” 
removal. Id. at 210 (quoting Doe, 14 F.3d at 202) (alteration in 
original). Our recognition of a “narrow” exception for direct 
orders from a higher court that expressly authorize a defendant 
to remove does not help Senator Scarnati here. Doe, 14 F.3d at 
202. 
 
Accordingly, we cannot say that the District Court 
abused its discretion in concluding Senator Scarnati lacked an 
objectively reasonable basis for contending the Writ of 
Election was an “other paper” under § 1446(b)(3). The writ is 
a procedural mechanism mandated by the federal Constitution; 
its issuance was external to the parties’ state court litigation. 
Under our precedents, only a “narrow” set of developments 
that are not “within [the] case” may qualify as an “order” under 
§ 1446(b)(3). Miller, 769 F.3d at 210. Though we reiterate that 
a “colorable removal claim in an area of unsettled law” does 
not merit a § 1447(c) award, Roxbury Condo. Ass’n v. Anthony 
S. Cupo Agency, 316 F.3d 224, 228 (3d Cir. 2003), we see no 
abuse of discretion here.4 
                                              
4  As noted, the District Court also held removal was 
improper for the additional and independent reason that 
Senator Scarnati failed to obtain the consent of the executive 
defendants. See 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(2)(A). The Court rejected 
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B. 
Although we affirm the District Court’s order awarding 
costs and fees under § 1447(c), we must also consider its 
decision to hold Senate President Pro Tempore Scarnati 
personally liable for the award in this official capacity suit. 
Neither party has cited any case that addresses whether § 
1447(c) allows a court to levy costs and fees on an official-
capacity defendant in his or her personal capacity.  
                                              
his argument that the executive defendants were nominal 
parties, noting he had earlier argued that Governor Wolf was 
an “indispensable party” because the relief sought required the 
Governor’s participation. League of Women Voters of Pa., 
2018 WL 1787211, at *4. See generally Johnson v. SmithKline 
Beecham Corp., 724 F.3d 337, 359 n.27 (3d Cir. 2013) (noting 
that removing defendants need not secure consent from 
“nominal parties”). But whether a party can be “indispensable” 
because of its ministerial role in effecting a judgment, but 
nominal for removal purposes, is an unresolved question, with 
courts offering indirect support to both sides. Compare, e.g., 
Steel Valley Auth. v. Union Switch & Signal Div., 809 F.2d 
1006, 1010 (3d Cir. 1987) (stating “while nominal or 
fraudulently joined parties may be disregarded [in considering 
diversity jurisdiction], indispensable parties may not”), with 
Lincoln Prop. Co. v. Roche, 546 U.S. 81, 92 (2005) (observing 
that parties “joined only as designated performer of a 
ministerial act” do not satisfy diversity requirements) (citing 
Walden v. Skinner, 101 U.S. 577, 589 (1880)). Because we 
conclude the District Court did not abuse its discretion when it 
ruled that Senator Scarnati lacked an objectively reasonable 
basis for thinking removal was timely, we need not resolve this 
question today. 
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We find instructive the Supreme Court’s reasoning in a 
similar context. In Kentucky v. Graham, the Supreme Court 
considered “whether 42 U.S.C. § 1988”—the fee-shifting 
provision for federal civil rights suits—“allows attorney’s fees 
to be recovered from a governmental entity when a plaintiff 
sues governmental employees only in their personal 
capacities.” 473 U.S. 159, 161 (1985). The Court recognized 
that § 1988—like § 1447(c)—“does not in so many words 
define the parties who must bear” a costs and fees award. Id. at 
164. Nonetheless, the Court found it “clear” that the “losing 
party” bears cost and fee liability. Id. It explained that “[p]roper 
application of this principle” in actions involving public 
officials “requires careful adherence to the distinction between 
personal- and official-capacity action suits.” Id. at 165. An 
official-capacity suit is “to be treated as a suit against the entity 
[of which the office is an agent]” and “is not a suit against the 
official personally, for the real party in interest is the entity.” 
Id. at 166 (citation omitted). Because of this distinction, “a suit 
against a government official in his or her personal capacity 
cannot lead to imposition of fee liability upon the 
governmental entity,” id. at 167, which “is not even a party to 
a personal-capacity lawsuit,” id. at 168. An officer in his 
personal capacity is a different entity than that same officer in 
his official capacity, and the officer is only party to a suit in the 
capacity he is named. “That a plaintiff has prevailed against 
one party does not entitle him to fees from another party, let 
alone from a nonparty.” Id.; see also Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 
678, 699 n.32 (1978) (observing that to require an officer to 
pay a fee award in an individual capacity is “manifestly unfair 
when . . . the individual officers have no personal interest in 
the conduct of the State’s litigation”). 
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 We apply the same principles here. Section 1447(c) 
does not expressly state who may be required to pay costs and 
fees. But like the Court in Graham, we recognize that it applies 
only to “losing part[ies]”—in removal cases, the defendant that 
improperly removed the case. 473 U.S. at 164; cf. Martin, 546 
U.S. at 141 (“[C]ourts may award attorney’s fees under § 
1447(c) only where the removing party lacked an objectively 
reasonable basis for seeking removal.”). It is undisputed that 
Senator Scarnati was named a defendant in his official capacity 
only, as the President Pro Tempore of the State Senate. 
Accordingly, this “is not a suit against [him] personally, for the 
real party in interest is the entity” he represents. Graham, 473 
U.S. at 166; cf. Karcher v. May, 484 U.S. 72, 78 (1987) (“We 
have repeatedly recognized that the real party in interest in 
an official-capacity suit is the entity represented and not the 
individual officeholder.”). Because this is an “an official-
capacity action,” plaintiffs are “entitled to look for relief, both 
on the merits and for fees, to the governmental entity” only. 
Graham, 473 U.S. at 171. Senator Scarnati in his personal 
capacity—a nonparty to this action—cannot be made to pay. 
 
Plaintiffs offer two arguments for why personal liability 
is still appropriate, but neither is convincing. First, they rely on 
the law of qualified immunity to contend Senator Scarnati’s 
“objectively unreasonable conduct in this case merited the 
imposition of personal liability.” Appellee’s Br. 45. This 
argument fails because the qualified immunity doctrine applies 
when an official is sued in his or her personal capacity—the 
official is personally made a party to the suit. See Melo v. 
Hafer, 912 F.2d 628, 636 (3d Cir. 1990) (“[Q]ualified 
immunity . . . [is] a defense available only for governmental 
officials when they are sued in their personal, and not in their 
official, capacity.”). Here, Senator Scarnati was sued in his 
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official capacity only, and Graham counsels adherence to the 
distinction between personal and official capacity actions. 
Senator Scarnati is personally not a party to the suit, so a § 
1447(c) award cannot be made against him in his personal 
capacity.5 
 
Plaintiffs also suggest fees can be awarded against 
Senator Scarnati personally because he acted in bad faith. But 
the District Court had the opportunity to make a bad faith 
finding and explicitly did “not come to any conclusion that 
improper motive or bad faith [was] involved.” League of 
Women Voters of Pa., 2018 WL 1787211, at *6. Fee-shifting 
on this basis is not warranted. 
 
In sum, the District Court erred in awarding fees against 
Senator Scarnati in his personal capacity. Named in the suit in 
his official capacity as President Pro Tempore of the State 
Senate, he was personally not a party in this action, and the 
Court has no power under § 1447(c) to sanction a nonparty. 
Because it neither found bad faith nor invoked any other source 
of authority to impose sanctions on Senator Scarnati in his 
personal capacity, we will not consider on appeal whether such 
sanctions would be appropriate. Cf. Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 
                                              
5  In addition, plaintiffs’ analogy fails because the 
standard for imposing fees under § 1447(c) is not coextensive 
with the standard for defeating qualified immunity. An official 
is not entitled to qualified immunity if the official violates a 
“clearly established” right; § 1447(c) fees are available if there 
is no “objectively reasonable” basis for removal. As we have 
explained, § 1447(c) does not require a showing that the 
removal was “frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.” 
Martin, 546 U.S. at 138. 
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501 U.S. 32, 40 n.5 (1991); Corder v. Howard Johnson & Co., 
53 F.3d 225, 232 (9th Cir. 1994). Accordingly, we will reverse 
the part of the Court’s order directing Senator Scarnati to 
personally pay to plaintiffs the costs and fees award, and 
remand for further proceedings. 
 
C. 
Finally, we turn to Senator Scarnati’s remaining 
argument that the Court erred in calculating the award. As 
noted, plaintiffs sought $49,616.50 in attorneys’ fees and 
$3,120.02 in costs incurred in the emergency response to 
Senator Scarnati’s removal and in preparing the subsequent § 
1447(c) fees and costs motion. The District Court did not abuse 
its discretion in awarding $26,240 in fees and $3,120.02 in 
costs. 
 
In calculating the fee award, the Court properly applied 
the lodestar method, multiplying a reasonable hourly billing 
rate for the lawyers’ services by the reasonable number of 
hours expended on the litigation. See In re AT & T Corp., 455 
F.3d 160, 164 (3d Cir. 2006). As to billing rate, it agreed with 
Senator Scarnati that counsel from Arnold & Porter Kaye 
Scholer should not be reimbursed at the higher Washington, 
D.C. rates, and instead looked to “customary Philadelphia legal 
fees.” League of Women Voters of Pa., 2018 WL 1787211, at 
*6; accord Interfaith Cmty. Org. v. Honeywell Int’l, Inc., 426 
F.3d 694, 699 (3d Cir. 2005). We discern no error in the 
District Court’s application of a blended hourly rate of $400—
a median rate for the Philadelphia-based Public Interest Law 
Center lawyers—which Senator Scarnati acknowledges is a 
“fair reflection of the prevailing market rates.” Appellant’s Br. 
38; accord In re Rite Aid Corp. Sec. Litig., 396 F.3d 294, 306 
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(3d Cir. 2005) (“[D]istrict courts should apply blended billing 
rates that approximate the fee structure of all the attorneys who 
worked on the matter.”).  
 
With respect to the time billed, the notice of removal 
presented plaintiffs with an emergency situation and a range of 
complex legal issues to address in a short period of time. 
Consistent with the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s recognition 
of the import of the state court litigation, plaintiffs did not 
respond inappropriately. The District Court’s decision to 
award fees less a reduction to account for overlap was proper 
in these circumstances. Accord Bell v. United Princeton 
Props., Inc., 884 F.2d 713, 721 (3d Cir. 1989) (observing that 
fee request reductions require “flexibility,” as “the court will 
inevitably be required to engage in a fair amount of ‘judgment 
calling’ based upon its experience with the case and its general 
experience”).  
 
Likewise, the District Court did not abuse its discretion 
in awarding $2,185 in costs incurred by Arnold & Porter Kaye 
Scholer for Westlaw legal research. Cf. Wehr v. Burroughs 
Corp., 619 F.2d 276, 285 (3d Cir. 1980) (awarding research 
fees and noting that “[u]se of computer-aided legal research . . 
. is certainly reasonable, if not essential, in contemporary legal 
practice”). It properly reviewed the supporting documentation 
submitted by plaintiffs and explained why it determined the 
costs sought for research were reasonable. 
 
Accordingly, we will affirm the costs and fees awarded. 
 
III. 
In sum, we conclude the District Court did not abuse its 
 20 
discretion in determining plaintiffs were entitled to a costs and 
fees award under § 1447(c) or in calculating the proper award. 
But because it erred in imposing fees on Senator Scarnati in his 
personal capacity, we will reverse that part of the order and 
remand for further proceedings. 
